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Abstract
Background: Although border quarantine is included in many influenza pandemic plans, detailed
guidelines have yet to be formulated, including considerations for the optimal quarantine length.
Motivated by the situation of small island nations, which will probably experience the introduction
of pandemic influenza via just one airport, we examined the potential effectiveness of quarantine as
a border control measure.
Methods: Analysing the detailed epidemiologic characteristics of influenza, the effectiveness of
quarantine at the borders of islands was modelled as the relative reduction of the risk of releasing
infectious individuals into the community, explicitly accounting for the presence of asymptomatic
infected individuals. The potential benefit of adding the use of rapid diagnostic testing to the
quarantine process was also considered.
Results: We predict that 95% and 99% effectiveness in preventing the release of infectious
individuals into the community could be achieved with quarantine periods of longer than 4.7 and
8.6 days, respectively. If rapid diagnostic testing is combined with quarantine, the lengths of
quarantine to achieve 95% and 99% effectiveness could be shortened to 2.6 and 5.7 days,
respectively. Sensitivity analysis revealed that quarantine alone for 8.7 days or quarantine for 5.7
days combined with using rapid diagnostic testing could prevent secondary transmissions caused by
the released infectious individuals for a plausible range of prevalence at the source country (up to
10%) and for a modest number of incoming travellers (up to 8000 individuals).
Conclusion: Quarantine at the borders of island nations could contribute substantially to
preventing the arrival of pandemic influenza (or at least delaying the arrival date). For small island
nations we recommend consideration of quarantine alone for 9 days or quarantine for 6 days
combined with using rapid diagnostic testing (if available).
Background
Strict maritime quarantine (with facility quarantine on
land in some cases), appeared to effectively prevent the
entry of the 1918–19 influenza pandemic into American
Samoa and delayed its entry into mainland Australia, Tas-
mania and New Caledonia [1]. Quarantine measures dur-
ing this pandemic also worked successfully in Yerba
Buena, an island off San Francisco [2], and within parts of
Iceland [3]. More generally, a systematic review has
reported evidence that interventions that included quar-
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in containing respiratory virus epidemics [4]. An earlier
review had suggested a limited use for quarantine but had
focused on quarantine attempts in countries with porous
land borders [5].
Since it appears that quarantine was successful in island
settings from 1918–19, some Pacific island nations have
included the option of border quarantine in their current
influenza pandemic plans [6]. Theoretically, since small
island nations will most likely experience introduction of
pandemic influenza at just one airport or seaport alone,
the use of border control would be one of the most impor-
tant options to protect their communities from the pan-
demic. As an example, New Zealand consists of multiple
islands and has a pandemic plan that includes significant
detail about border control and quarantine [6,7]. In addi-
tion, border quarantine is also included in the pandemic
plans of some European countries [8].
However, detailed guidelines for effective use of quaran-
tine have yet to be formulated. One of the key questions
among infectious disease specialists and public health
practitioners is how to optimise the duration of quaran-
tine to achieve a desired level of effectiveness. Presently,
there is no universal proposal for quarantine period fol-
lowing exposure to pandemic influenza cases. Although
the etymological root of quarantine originates from 13th
century public health practices requiring incoming ships
to remain in port for 40 days [9], quarantine in the present
day refers to compulsory physical separation for a defined
period, including restriction of movement, of healthy
individuals who have been potentially exposed to an
infectious disease [10]. Since the restriction of movement
often involves legal and ethical constraints, because it lim-
its the freedom of quarantined individuals [11], the opti-
mal length of quarantine needs to be clarified using
scientifically sound approaches.
To suggest the optimal length of quarantine for pandemic
influenza, we need to consider the detailed epidemiologic
characteristics of this disease including the presence of
asymptomatic infection [12]. The present study aimed to
assess the potential effectiveness of quarantine, suggest an




To clarify the optimal length of quarantine, we first con-
sider a hypothetical setting where infected travellers are
flying from a nation with an epidemic (somewhere in
Asia, given the data on the origin of seasonal influenza
[13]) to a disease-free small island nation (e.g., New Zea-
land or smaller South Pacific and Caribbean islands). Spe-
cifically, we consider a situation when the disease-free
country is fortunate enough to be informed about the pos-
sible emergence of the influenza pandemic at the source,
sufficiently in advance of its arrival to implement border
control measures. Given that the possible emergence is
still uncertain and very recent news, we assume that the
disease-free island nation is not ready or willing to com-
pletely shut down all its airports, but that quarantine is
immediately instituted at the border. Before closing all the
airports we assume that the island nation still permits the
arrival of 20 aircraft with a total of 8000 incoming indi-
viduals (i.e., each with 400 individuals including airline
staff on board) who were potentially exposed to influenza
at the source country or on the aircraft. For this popula-
tion of travellers we explore the question – how long
should we place them in quarantine?
We assume that all incoming individuals are placed into
routine quarantine on arrival in the island nation and are
monitored for onset of symptoms during the quarantine
period. We also assume that all infected individuals who
develop influenza symptoms are successfully detected
(e.g., through self-report questionnaires, reporting by
ground staff, specific interview assessment by trained
health personnel and/or thermal scanning). The impact of
imperfect detection on the effectiveness of quarantine is
examined in the Appendix. Optimistically, symptomatic
cases are assumed to be immediately isolated in a desig-
nated facility at symptom onset, and assumed not to result
in any secondary transmissions [14]. Similarly, those who
developed symptoms en-route are also assumed to be suc-
cessfully isolated upon arrival (and we ignore these indi-
viduals in the following analyses as the detection is owing
to the entry screening). We assume that quarantine secu-
rity would be fully effective and that no secondary trans-
mission would occur in the quarantine facility. Successful
detection during quarantine relies largely on onset of
influenza-like symptoms, but, as a possible option, we
also consider adding rapid diagnostic testing to improve
the sensitivity of case detection.
Epidemiologic characteristics of influenza
To theoretically and quantitatively examine the effective-
ness of quarantine, we use several parameters describing
the epidemiologic characteristics of seasonal influenza –
which we then use for considering pandemic influenza.
The most important of these characteristics is the cumula-
tive distribution of the incubation period (i.e., the time
from infection to onset) of length t, F(t). The incubation
period has been very useful in suggesting the optimal
length of quarantine for many diseases [15], because arbi-
trarily taking the 95th or 99th percentile point as the quar-
antine period could ensure the absence of symptomatic
infection with probability of 95% or 99% [12,16-21].
However, it is difficult to directly apply this concept to
influenza [12], because the conditional probability, α, of
developing symptomatic disease (given infection) hasPage 2 of 14
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through quarantine is not relevant for asymptomatic
infected individuals who account for the remaining
33.3%. Thus, we consider the effectiveness of quarantine
as the reduction of the risk of introducing "infectious"
individuals into the community and, thus, additionally
use the cumulative distribution of the generation time
(i.e., the time from infection of a primary case to infection
of a secondary case by the primary case) of length t, G(t).
Further, to simulate the key ripple benefit of quarantine
(the predicted number of secondary transmissions caused
by released infectious individuals), we assume that the
reproduction numbers of symptomatic (Rs) and asympto-
matic cases (Ra), i.e., the average numbers of secondary
transmissions caused by a single symptomatic case and an
asymptomatic case are 2.0 and 1.0, respectively. The basic
reproduction number, R0, is therefore αRs+(1-α)Ra = 1.67
which corresponds to an estimate in a previous study [24].
Moreover, the estimate is also within the estimated range
of community transmission in another study which
explored various historical data [25].
Distribution of the incubation period, which was
assumed to follow a gamma distribution, was extracted
from a published dataset [26]. Since the original data
showed daily frequency of onset only, we fitted the cumu-
lative distribution of the incubation period to the
observed data, minimising the sum of squared errors. We
did not identify more detailed data and note that the
obtained frequency did not deviate much from outbreak
data on an aircraft [27,28], a historical study of Spanish
influenza [15,29], and from data in a published meta-
analysis [22]. Similarly, the generation time was retrieved
from a previous study of volunteers infected with influ-
enza [22], which assumed that infectiousness is propor-
tional to viral shedding, and we obtained the parameter
estimates by minimising the sum of squared errors. A log-
normal distribution was employed to model the genera-
tion time. Strictly speaking, the viral shedding curve alone
does not inform the generation time, but our outcome
measure (i.e., the probability of releasing infectious indi-
viduals) is reasonably analysed using virological data (as
we are dealing with infectiousness), assuming that the fre-
quency of contact is independent of time since infection.
Furthermore, we favoured the use of this dataset as it
would give a more conservative result since the right-tail
is fatter than those assumed previously [30,31].
Effectiveness of quarantine
Although secondary transmission on aircraft is probably
relatively rare due to the functioning of ventilation sys-
tems [32,33], a previous transmission event has been
reported in this setting [27]. Therefore, we use arrival time
as the latest time of possible infection (i.e., t = 0). In other
words, we conservatively argue the quarantine period as if
all infected incoming individuals experienced this infec-
tion upon arrival. In reality, earlier acquisition of infec-
tion would increase the probability of non-infection after
quarantine and therefore increase the effectiveness of
quarantine. Although our worst case scenario potentially
overestimates the optimal length of quarantine, a more
realistic scenario requires the exact time of infection for all
incoming infected individuals, which is in principle
impractical (see Appendix for more detailed insights into
this issue).
We considered the effectiveness of quarantine, ε(t), as a
relative reduction of the risk of introducing infected indi-
viduals into the community as a function of time since
infection t, i.e.,
where r1(t) and r0(t) are the risks of releasing infected indi-
viduals into a new community in the presence and
absence of the quarantine measure, respectively. Since all
infected individuals enter the community without quar-
antine, we assume r0(t) = 1 for any t. If the risk in the pres-
ence of quarantine, r1(t), is regarded as the risk of
releasing "symptomatic infected" individuals (regardless
of infectiousness) after quarantine of length t, r1(t) is
given by 1-F(t). Therefore, only the incubation period
determines the effectiveness, i.e., ε(t) = F(t), which has
been the fundamental concept in previous studies [12,15-
21]. However, we further consider the infectiousness for
influenza, emphasising the importance of asymptomatic
infection, because the proportion 100×(1-α) is as large as
33.3%. We thus regard the risk r1(t) as the probability of
releasing "infectious" individuals into the community
after quarantine of t days.
To comprehensively discuss this issue we decompose r1(t)
into the sum of symptomatic and asymptomatic individ-
uals (denoted by r1s(t) and r1a(t), respectively). For those
who will eventually develop symptoms, the probability of
release, r1s(t), is
r1s(t) = α(1 - F(t))(1 - G(t)) (2)
where F(t) and G(t) are, respectively, the cumulative dis-
tributions of the incubation period and generation time.
Because of the absence of adequate data, we assume inde-
pendence between the incubation period and generation
time, which most likely yields conservative estimates of
the effectiveness (compared to that explicitly addressing
dependence between these two distributions). For those
who remained asymptomatic throughout the entire
course of infection, the probability r1a(t) is
r1a(t) = (1-α)(1-G(t)) (3)
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tion of asymptomatic infected individuals. Due to the
absence of data, it should be noted that we assume that
the length of generation time among asymptomatic indi-
viduals is identical to that among symptomatic cases, an
assumption that has been used by others [24,25]. As the
assumption adds an uncertainty to the model prediction,
we examine the potential impact of differing generation
times between symptomatic and asymptomatic infected
individuals (see Appendix). Consequently, the effective-
ness of quarantine, ε(t), is given by subtracting r1s(t) and
r1a(t) from 1: i.e.,
ε(t) = 1 - [α(1 - F(t))(1 - G(t)) + (1 - α)(1 - G(t))]
(4)
We further investigate the additional benefit of testing for
the pandemic influenza virus using rapid diagnostic test-
ing during quarantine. A key assumption made is that the
currently available diagnostic tests would perform as well
with the new pandemic strain of virus (and be supplied to
the islands in time). We assume that the sensitivity (Se)
and specificity (Sp) of the rapid diagnostic test are 69.0%
and 99.0%, respectively [34]. Since our effectiveness
measure is conditioned on infected individuals, the risk of
releasing infectious individuals in the presence of quaran-
tine with use of rapid diagnostic testing is obtained by
multiplying a factor (1-Se) to r1(t) which represents a pro-
portion of cases that are missed even following rapid diag-
nostic testing. Thus, we get the effectiveness εd(t) as
εd(t) = 1 - (1 - Se) [α(1 - F(t)) (1 - G(t)) + (1 - α) (1 - G(t))]
(5)
Due to the absence of more detailed data, we assume that
both the sensitivity and specificity of the rapid diagnostic
test are independent of time since infection. Considering
that the sensitivity may well decline in later stages of illness
(by implicitly assuming that the diagnostic test is correlated
with viral load), it should be noted that the results associ-
ated with equation (5) are probably most valid only for
those in the early stage of illness (which is consistent with
our particular interest in quarantine period). We stress that
the estimated effectiveness εd(t) for a long quarantine
period (e.g., longer than 8 days) should be treated cau-
tiously. Since the sensitivity Se of asymptomatic infected
individuals may be smaller than that among symptomatic
cases (due to lower virus shedding titres among asympto-
matic individuals), we examine the effectiveness of quaran-
tine with differing Se between symptomatic and
asymptomatic infected individuals (see Appendix).
Sensitivity analysis and preventive performance
We also examined the sensitivity of our effectiveness meas-
ures (4) and (5) to different lengths of quarantine and prev-
alence levels at the source by means of simulations. First,
the sensitivity was assessed using the number of released
infectious individuals after quarantine of length t. We
examined plausible prevalence levels of 1%, 5% and 10%
at the source, which respectively indicate that there were 80,
400 and 800 infected individuals among a total of 8000
incoming individuals. The highest prevalence, 10%, may
represent transmission events within an airport of the
country of origin or on an aircraft. The analysis was made
by randomly simulating the incubation period (F), the gen-
eration time (G), the presence of any symptoms (α) and the
sensitivity of the rapid diagnostic test (Se) where F and G
randomly follow the assumed gamma and lognormal dis-
tributions, respectively. The two dichotomous variables
(i.e., the presence of symptoms and sensitivity of the rapid
diagnostic test) were randomly simulated with uniform
distributions (i.e., drawing random real numbers from 0 to
1) and using cut-off points at α = 0.667 and Se = 0.690. The
random sampling was performed for the number of
infected individuals (80, 400 and 800 times) in each simu-
lation, and the simulation was run 100 times for each
length of quarantine and prevalence level. To show the rip-
ple benefit, we also investigated the number of secondary
transmissions caused by released infectious individuals.
This estimate was achieved by further randomly simulating
the numbers of symptomatic and asymptomatic secondary
transmissions. Both numbers were assumed to follow Pois-
son distributions with mean Rs(1-G(td))(1-F(td)) and Ra(1-
G(td)), respectively, for each of the released symptomatic
and asymptomatic infectious individuals after the quaran-
tine of length td days.
Finally, we examined the preventive performance of quar-
antine combined with rapid diagnostic testing. When the
combination scheme is employed, those testing negative
to the rapid diagnostic test following quarantine of length
t would be the population of interest, as they are then
released into the community. Let p be the prevalence level
at the source (0 ≤ p ≤ 1). Among infected individuals (who
account for 100p% of the travellers), the fraction of those
who are detected or lose infectiousness following quaran-
tine of length t (i.e., true positives) is (1-r1(t)). Of the
remaining infected individuals r1(t), the fraction of those
testing positive, Ser1(t), to the rapid diagnostic test are
placed into isolation and, thus, are added to the true pos-
itives. Consequently, the remaining fraction (1-Se)r1(t)
are false negatives and are released into the community
(Figure 1). Among uninfected individuals (i.e., 100(1-p)%
of the travellers), the length of quarantine does not influ-
ence the preventive performance (because they are not
infected and their quarantine is irrelevant to the loss of
infectiousness). Thus, among the total number of incom-
ing travellers, the fractions (1-p)(1-Sp) and (1-p)Sp will be
testing positive (false positives) and negative (true nega-
tives), respectively, to the rapid diagnostic test. Conse-
quently, positive predictive value (PPV) of quarantine
combined with rapid diagnostic testing isPage 4 of 14
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PPV measures the preventive performance of quarantine
policy to correctly place infected individuals in quarantine
(or isolation) during their infectious period (i.e., how effi-
ciently are we placing infectious individuals in the quar-
antine facility, among a total of those who are diagnosed
as positive either by quarantine of length t or rapid diag-
nostic testing). NPV measures the preventive performance
of the release policy (i.e., how large is the fraction of true
negatives among a total of those who are diagnosed as
negative after the quarantine of length t and rapid diag-
nostic testing). We numerically computed both PPV and
NPV for different prevalence levels (from 0–15%) and dif-
ferent lengths of quarantine (from 0 to 10 days). All anal-
yses were made using the statistical software JMP ver. 7.0
(SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC).
Results
Intrinsic dynamics of influenza
Figure 2 shows density functions of the incubation period
and generation time. The incubation period was similar to
those reported previously [12,27,28]. Mean and variance
of the incubation period were estimated as 1.43 days and
0.48 days2, respectively. The generation time in the figure
includes the original datasets on different types of influ-
enza virus (weighed by each sample size). The mean,
median (25–75th percentile) and variance of the genera-
tion time were 2.92 days, 2.27 (1.41–3.67) days and 5.57
days2, respectively.
Effectiveness of quarantine
Figure 3 shows the estimated effectiveness of quarantine as
a function of time since infection (i.e., time since arrival). A
different effectiveness measure (i.e., relative reduction of
the risk of releasing "symptomatic infected" individuals
regardless of infectiousness) is shown (dashed line) com-
paratively with the other two results showing the relative
reduction of the risk of releasing "infectious" individuals in
the presence and absence of the use of rapid diagnostic test-
ing (thin and thick solid lines, respectively). It should be
noted that the reduction of symptomatic infected individu-
als is based only on the incubation period, measuring a dif-
ferent concept of effectiveness from other two. The
incubation period alone suggests that 95% effectiveness in
preventing the release of symptomatic infected individuals
is achieved by quarantine of 2.73 days.
We predict that 95% and 99% effectiveness in preventing
the release of infectious individuals is achieved with quar-
antine periods of longer than 4.74 and 8.62 days, respec-
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Performance of quarantine combined with rapid diagnostic testingFigure 1
Performance of quarantine combined with rapid 
diagnostic testing. r1(t) is the probability of releasing infec-
tious individuals following the quarantine of length t days. Se = 
sensitivity of the rapid diagnostic test; Sp = specificity of the 
rapid diagnostic test; p = prevalence at the source commu-
nity. Among infected individuals, those testing negative after 
quarantine of length t (i.e., p(1-Se)r1(t)) are released into the 
community. Among uninfected individuals, those testing neg-
ative (i.e., (1-p)Sp) are released.
Probability density functions of the incubation period and generation time of influenzaFigu e 2
Probability density functions of the incubation period 
and generation time of influenza. Gamma distribution 
was employed to model the incubation period (i.e., the time 
from infection to onset), whereas lognormal distribution was 
fitted to the generation time (i.e., the time from infection of a 
primary case to infection of a secondary case by the primary 
case). The mean and variance of the incubation period and 
generation time are estimated as 1.43 days and 0.48 days2 
and 2.92 days and 5.57 days2, respectively. For the original 
data see: [22] and [26].Page 5 of 14
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a short quarantine period. If a rapid diagnostic test was
available and this performed to the current standard for
detecting influenza A in the pre-pandemic setting, we esti-
mated that this additional testing would result in quaran-
tine periods for longer than 2.59 and 5.71 days having
effectiveness of over 95% and 99% respectively (Figure 3).
Sensitivity analysis
Given the above mentioned results, we investigated the
sensitivity of quarantine effectiveness to four different
lengths of quarantine (2.8, 4.8, 5.7 and 8.7 days) and to
three different prevalence levels at the source (1%, 5% and
10%). The shortest length, 2.8 days, was suggested by the
incubation period as being 95% effective in preventing the
release of symptomatic infected individuals into the com-
munity. Two of the others (4.8 and 8.7 days) corresponded
to 95% and 99% effectiveness in preventing release of
infectious individuals by means of quarantine alone, and
5.7 days corresponded to 99% effectiveness when quaran-
tine was combined with rapid diagnostic testing.
Figure 4 shows the median (and 5–95th percentile) num-
bers of infectious individuals who are released into the
community after quarantine of specified lengths. The
quarantine for 2.8 days could miss as many as 11 (5–16),
56 (45–68) and 114 (92–129) infectious cases for the
prevalence of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively in the 8000
arriving travellers considered. However, these misses were
reduced to 4 (1–7), 20 (13–27) and 39 (28–53) cases by
the quarantine of length 4.8 days, to 3 (0–5), 13 (7–19)
and 27 (16–36) by 5.7 days and, moreover, to 1 (0–2), 4
(1–8) and 8 (4–13) cases by 8.7 days. The additional diag-
nostic testing could greatly reduce the released number of
infectious individuals (Figure 4B). For the quarantine
lengths of 2.8 and 5.7 days with rapid diagnostic testing,
3 (1–7), 18 (10–25) and 34 (25–45) cases and 1 (0–2), 4
(1–8) and 8 (4–14) cases, respectively, were expected be
released into the community for the prevalence of 1%, 5%
and 10%. All values for the quarantine period of 5.7 days
combined with use of a diagnostic test were less than 3%
of the total number of incoming infected individuals.
Figure 5 describes the ripple benefit of quarantine,
expressed as the number of secondary transmissions
caused by released infectious individuals. The qualitative
patterns found were similar to those of Figure 4, but it
should be noted that no secondary transmission was
observed in the community in several scenarios. Quaran-
tine of length 2.8 days, with or without rapid diagnostic
testing, would lead to many secondary transmissions
caused by released infectious individuals. When there was
quarantine of 4.8 days without rapid diagnostic testing,
we found 0 (0–2), 3 (1–7) and 5 (1–11) secondary trans-
missions. Extending quarantine to 8.7 days resulted in no
secondary transmissions at prevalence levels of 1%, 5%
and 10% (i.e., all were 0 except for 1 secondary transmis-
sion at the 95th percentile for all three prevalence levels).
When diagnostic testing was combined with the quaran-
tine period for 5.7 days, 0 (0–1), 0 (0–1) and 0 (0–2) sec-
ondary transmissions resulted. That is, even though
quarantine alone for 8.7 days and quarantine combined
with diagnostic testing for 5.7 days permit the release of
several infectious individuals (up to 3% of the total
number of incoming infected passengers), the majority of
the released cases are at the late stage of infection and
hardly cause secondary transmissions in the island nation
(i.e. even in the worst case, only a few secondary transmis-
sions would be expected).
Preventive performance of quarantine with rapid 
diagnostic testing
Figure 6 shows contour plots of PPV and NPV of quaran-
tine combined with rapid diagnostic testing as functions
of the length of quarantine and prevalence of influenza at
the source. Given a fixed prevalence, PPV was greater for
shorter length of quarantine (especially, for t < 1 day) due
mainly to the relative increase in detection of true posi-
tives by rapid diagnostic testing (see equation (6)). How-
ever, it became less sensitive to the length of quarantine as
the length became longer (for t > 2 days) and depended
Effectiveness of quarantine with and without use of rapid diagnostic testing as  fu ction of time since inf ction (i.e., time since arrival)Figure 3
Effectiveness of quarantine with and without use of 
rapid diagnostic testing as a function of time since 
infection (i.e., time since arrival). Different effectiveness 
measures of quarantine are comparatively shown. The 
dashed line represents the effectiveness of quarantine, meas-
ured as the relative reduction of the risk of releasing "symp-
tomatic infected" individuals (regardless of infectiousness) 
based on the incubation period alone. The two continuous 
lines measure the effectiveness as the relative reduction of 
the risk of releasing "infectious individuals" into the commu-
nity, based on the incubation period, generation time and 
probability of symptomatic disease, with (thin) and without 
(thick) use of rapid diagnostic testing. The sensitivity of the 
rapid diagnostic test was assumed to be 69.0% (based on cur-
rent test performance for seasonal influenza A [34]).Page 6 of 14
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onstrates that NPV was on the whole very high and sensi-
tive to both the length of quarantine and prevalence at the
source. For prevalence levels up to 10%, NPV with quar-
antine for longer than 2 days could be greater than 99.0%.
In particular, at a quarantine length of 6 days, NPV was
greater than 99.9% for prevalence levels up to 10%. In
other words, within the range of interest for quarantine
lengths, PPV was mainly determined by the prevalence
level (i.e., longer quarantine with rapid diagnostic testing
does not load too many additional false positives on iso-
lation facilities compared with the use of shorter quaran-
tine and testing). Also, NPV can be extremely high,
indicating that the release policy can efficiently suggest
that the released individuals are likely to be true negatives.
Discussion
The present study provides theoretical support for border
quarantine as a worthwhile pandemic influenza control
measure for small island nations. Detailed advance plan-
ning for quarantine measures may therefore be justified
during the pre-pandemic period. From our quantitative
findings, we recommend a quarantine period of 9 days
(rounding 8.7 days to the next integer) to reduce by more
than 99% the risk of introducing infectious individuals and
to ensure the absence of secondary transmissions caused by
released infectious individuals in the community. If the use
of rapid diagnostic testing can be combined with quaran-
tine, the quarantine period could be shortened to 6 days
(rounding 5.7 days to the next integer). To the best of our
knowledge, the present study is the first to explicitly suggest
an optimal length of quarantine for pandemic influenza
derived from detailed epidemiologic characteristics of this
infection. Although our recommendations are based on
arbitrarily considering the specific percentiles of effective-
ness, and although the absence of secondary transmissions
depends also on the absolute number of incoming individ-
uals, we believe that our findings (with realistic ranges of
prevalence and the number of travellers) provide evidence-
based estimates that can be used for pandemic planning.
Quarantine might ultimately be unsuccessful in preventing
importation of infected individuals [35]. However, delayed
entry of the pandemic virus could provide time to intro-
duce other social distancing and pharmaceutical interven-
tions that may reduce the overall impact of a pandemic
[1,9,30,36-39].
In recent studies, the optimal length of quarantine was
considered by using the incubation period distribution
alone, identifying the 95th or 99th percentile point of the
Sensitivity of the number of infectious cases released into the community (after quarantine) to the different lengths of quaran-tine and prevalence lev ls at th  sourceFigure 4
Sensitivity of the number of infectious cases released into the community (after quarantine) to the different 
lengths of quarantine and prevalence levels at the source. A. Quarantine alone. B. Quarantine combined with rapid 
diagnostic testing. Sensitivity of the number of released infectious cases into the community (after quarantine) is examined for 
different lengths of quarantine (2.8, 4.8, 5.7 and 8.7 days) and prevalence levels at the source (1%, 5% and 10%). Each dot rep-
resents median estimate of 100 simulation runs. The whiskers extend out to 5th and 95th percentiles of the simulations.Page 7 of 14
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centiles of the incubation period for severe acute respira-
tory syndrome (SARS) and smallpox were suggested to be
11–13 days [19,21] and 16–17 days [16] since exposure,
respectively. Direct application of this concept to pan-
demic influenza suggests that the optimal quarantine
period for pandemic influenza is only 2.73 days since
exposure, which is far shorter than those for SARS and
smallpox. However, since influenza involves a non-negli-
gible fraction of asymptomatic infections [12,22], we also
undertook the additional step of incorporating this fea-
ture into our assessment of quarantine effectiveness. This
refinement permitted further elaboration of effectiveness
estimates, which we believe contributes to theoretical con-
siderations around the control of other infectious dis-
eases. In addition, we reasonably showed the preventive
performance of quarantine, expressed as the number of
released infectious individuals and the ripple benefit
expressed as number of secondary transmissions caused
by them. Using further information on the contact struc-
ture in the island nation, our framework could be further
extended to estimate the probability of extinction and the
delay effect of epidemic spread imposed by quarantine,
the latter of which was discussed by a recent study [35].
Although the recent study theoretically emphasises the
difficulty of effective border control (including quaran-
tine) [35], we stress that the epidemiologic characteristics
of influenza (e.g., short incubation period and generation
time) permit anticipating large ripple benefits from quar-
antine (given that importation may continue for only a
short period of time before full border closure occurs).
Access to a highly sensitive test for pandemic influenza
infection may increase the effectiveness of quarantine and
shorten the quarantine period routinely required for
incoming travellers. Preventive performance in finding true
positives (i.e., PPV of quarantine combined with rapid
diagnostic testing) appeared not to be very sensitive to the
length of quarantine (for t > 2 days). This result suggests
that if diagnostic test kit supplies are plentiful, then testing
should be done early in quarantine. But if a test kit sparing
approach is used (i.e., avoiding testing of those who
become symptomatic) then there is not much benefit in
delaying testing until after day 2 in quarantine. A test with
both high sensitivity and high specificity would also allow
for better use of resources if the travellers who tested nega-
tive are released into the community. Since PPV is mainly
determined by prevalence at the source, it should be noted
that an exit screening process at the source lowers the prev-
alence as well as PPV. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of
Sensitivity of the number of secondary transmissions caused by released infectious individuals to the different lengths of quar-antine and prevalence l vels at the sourceFigure 5
Sensitivity of the number of secondary transmissions caused by released infectious individuals to the different 
lengths of quarantine and prevalence levels at the source. A. Quarantine alone. B. Quarantine combined with rapid 
diagnostic testing. Sensitivity of the number of secondary transmissions caused by released infectious individuals is examined 
for different lengths of quarantine (2.8, 4.8, 5.7 and 8.7 days) and prevalence levels at the source (1%, 5% and 10%). Each dot 
represents median estimate of 100 simulation runs. The whiskers extend out to 5th and 95th percentiles of the simulations.Page 8 of 14
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moreover, lower prevalence among incoming individuals
yields a higher chance of extinction (or greater ripple effect
of quarantine (Figures 4 and 5)). NPV of quarantine com-
bined with diagnostic testing would be extremely high with
quarantine periods for lengths of 3 days or longer, support-
ing our suggestion to release quarantined individuals test-
ing negative to the rapid diagnostic test into the community
(if there was high confidence in test performance parame-
ters for the emergent pandemic strain). In light of our find-
ings, island countries may consider including influenza
testing capacity and test kit stockpiles in their pandemic
plans. The use of rapid diagnostic tests, if available through
stockpiling in advance or rapid delivery after pandemic
emergence, may permit more effective border control, with
more efficient use of isolation facilities and shortening of
the quarantine period.
The operation of quarantine would be most feasible for
islands with low traveller numbers and with pre-existing
facilities that could be used for quarantine (e.g., hotels).
Our study was indeed motivated by the consideration of
protecting small island nations (e.g., in the South Pacific
and Caribbean), because use of border control at usually
just one or two international airports would be the major
way in which the introduction of pandemic influenza
could be prevented in these islands. Yet the analysis could
potentially hold for larger island nations such as Australia,
whose pandemic plan also includes border quarantine
[40]. The logistics of quarantine might be far more
demanding in Australia with its multiple international air-
ports, but which nonetheless used strict maritime quaran-
tine to successfully delay the entry of the 1918 pandemic
[41]. Evidence about the geographic spread of influenza
highlights the importance of quarantine in multiple loca-
tions [42-44]. Small countries with land borders and lim-
ited entry points could also use these approaches to delay
entry of pandemic influenza as occurred for Israel in the
1957 influenza pandemic [5]. Facility-based quarantine
could also be supplemented with ongoing surveillance in
the community of those released from quarantine.
Our analysis employed a number of simplifying assump-
tions, among which we should emphasise the most
important one. The detailed natural history parameters
for seasonal influenza are not well documented and,
moreover, we of course do not know if the incubation
period and generation time of an emergent pandemic
strain would be close to those of seasonal influenza docu-
mented in the limited number of publications to date. It
should be noted that our analysis is solely based on the
available published evidence and that the effectiveness of
quarantine would be overestimated if the emergent strain
of pandemic influenza had a longer incubation period or
a longer generation time than we have assumed. However,
the incubation period for human infection with H5N1
appears to be similar to other sub-types infecting humans
[45]. This issue applies not only to the incubation period
but also to other parameters, the role of which for each
can be inspected using equations (4) and (5). For exam-
ple, a historical analysis suggests that only 9% of infec-
tions resulted in an asymptomatic infection [46], which
Diagnostic performance of quarantine with use of rapid diagnostic testingFigure 6
Diagnostic performance of quarantine with use of rapid diagnostic testing. A. Positive predictive values (PPV) and B. 
Negative predictive values (NPV) of quarantine combined with rapid diagnostic testing as functions of the length of quarantine 
and prevalence at the source. For the quarantine of 3 days or longer, PPV is less sensitive to the length of quarantine and 
depends almost only on the prevalence. NPV is sensitive to both the length of quarantine and prevalence at the source, achiev-
ing extremely high estimates to correctly release true negative individuals into the community.Page 9 of 14
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(compared to our results). Given that our exercise indi-
cates the critical importance of the incubation period and
generation time, epidemiological investigations should
be performed to better quantify these parameters and fur-
ther inform evidence-based pandemic planning.
Extrinsic factors should also be more precisely quantified in
future. As an indirect extrinsic effect, when infected individ-
uals are released into the community and become infec-
tious to others, recently quarantined individuals may be
detected and isolated earlier than those who have not been
quarantined [47]. Another issue of detection is that some
island states may have access to laboratory-based PCR
influenza tests which are far more sensitive and specific
than rapid tests [48], which could offer the test results in a
few hours and greatly shorten the length of quarantine.
To more appropriately quantify the effectiveness of quaran-
tine, two other technical issues have to be discussed. The
first is concerned with skewness of the offspring distribu-
tion (i.e. the distribution of the number of secondary trans-
missions caused by a single primary case). Although our
study reasonably showed the absence of secondary trans-
missions for quarantine of certain lengths, we ignored the
skewness (i.e., the presence of potential super-spreaders
[49]), and thus, the uncertainty bounds might have been
smaller than in reality. Although the mean and median of
the predicted number of secondary transmissions are still
valid, and even though the skewed offspring distribution
was partly incorporated in the model with the right-skewed
generation time distribution, super-spreading events
played a key role in triggering the international spread dur-
ing the epidemic of SARS, and in light of this, quantifica-
tion of the dispersion parameter (of the offspring
distribution) is needed in future studies. Another issue is
related to our conservative assumption that all incoming
individuals experienced infection upon arrival. Since it is
impractical to know the time of infection for all incoming
infected individuals (which should ideally be known when
the quarantine is started at time t = 0), we adopted a worst
case scenario where all infected individuals experience
infection at t = 0 (see Appendix). This assumption could
have overestimated the optimal length of quarantine. If fur-
ther research demonstrates that influenza transmission on
board flights is very rare, then it would be possible to set the
quarantine period to begin at the start of the flight and
therefore reduce its duration correspondingly following
arrival. However, then we have to take into account the pos-
sible secondary transmissions during the quarantine
period. Estimation of the effectiveness of imperfect quaran-
tine (i.e., quarantine which allows secondary transmissions
within the quarantine facility) would be far more compli-
cated than our simpler model, and clarification on this
point is a task for future research.
In addition to the present study, it should be noted that
quarantine may be combined with reduction of travel vol-
umes (e.g., even mandatory restrictions on non-essential
travel) which would have a large effect if it occurred rap-
idly [35,50,51]. Substantial reductions of travel volumes
could make the logistics of quarantine far more feasible
for island nations and increase the probability of ensuring
the absence of secondary transmissions (given the same
prevalence level to that of a larger travel volume). Moreo-
ver, there is the potential usefulness of antiviral prophy-
laxis during the quarantine period which could
theoretically reduce the number of infectious individuals.
Despite the plausible reduction of infectiousness under
antiviral prophylaxis, the probability of symptomatic
infection will also likely be reduced, and thus, the detec-
tion of cases might be reduced. Unless the efficacy of anti-
viral prophylaxis and detection under this measure are
well documented and promisingly high, it is difficult to
determine if this countermeasure is likely to offer an over-
all positive impact on the success of quarantine, and this
point should be clarified in future research. Another topic
area to be clarified further is concerned with cost-effective-
ness. Although we implicitly assumed that the govern-
ments of island nations may be willing to allocate
quarantine facilities and spend sufficient money for diag-
nostic testing, these measures are economically demand-
ing, especially for developing island nations. Extension of
our method would permit estimating the required cost to
achieve a specific ripple benefit (e.g., zero secondary cases
for a certain period of time). Use of home-based quaran-
tine (with health agency surveillance and support) is
another cost-saving option that could be considered for
islands with limited capacity for using facility-based quar-
antine (e.g., those with few hotels that could be requisi-
tioned), but it should be noted that home-based
quarantine might violate our assumption of ignoring sec-
ondary transmissions during the quarantine period. In
practice, there may also be scenarios where it is not prac-
tical to separate all incoming travellers into separate quar-
ters within a quarantine facility (e.g. parents with small
children). In such cases, health workers may need to mon-
itor such individuals especially closely and isolation may
need to include a parent and infant when only one is
symptomatic (all of which would increase costs).
Despite our simplifying assumptions, the present study
reasonably suggests that use of quarantine has the poten-
tial to substantially reduce the risk of pandemic influenza
arriving or at least significantly delay arrival, in small
island nations. To ensure the absence of secondary trans-
missions for plausible ranges of prevalence at the source
and a modest number of incoming travellers, we recom-
mend quarantining the incoming individuals for 9 days if
quarantine alone is implemented and 6 days if quarantine
is combined with rapid diagnostic testing.Page 10 of 14
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To inform border control for pandemic influenza in small
island nations we examined the potential effectiveness of
quarantine using several parameters which describe the
epidemiologic characteristics of influenza. In particular,
our modelling approach accounted for asymptomatic
infection which is deemed a key requirement for success-
ful influenza control [52,53]. The effectiveness was mod-
elled as a relative reduction of the risk of introducing
infectious individuals into the community as a function
of time since arrival. We recommend a quarantine period
of 9 days to reduce by more than 99% the risk of introduc-
ing infectious individuals and to ensure the absence of
secondary transmissions. When rapid diagnostic testing is
combined with quarantine, we recommend quarantine
for 6 days to similarly prevent secondary transmissions.
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Appendix
Earlier infection before quarantine
For simplicity, we consider the impact of earlier exposure
to infection on the effectiveness of quarantine in terms of
the frequency of onset during the quarantine period,
which is relevant to the determination of the incubation
period conducted by Anderson Grey McKendrick [15,29].
Let the length of quarantine be t. To account for earlier
infections before starting quarantine at t = 0, we consider
infection-age (i.e. the time since infection) for infected
individuals, denoted by τ. Let i(t, τ) and j(τ), respectively,
be the number of incubating infected individuals at quar-
antine period t and infection-age τ and the number of
incubating infected individuals at infection-age τ at the
beginning of quarantine t = 0 (i.e. i(0, τ) = j(τ)). i(t, τ) is
written as
for τ -t > 0 where Γ (τ) informs the survivorship function
of incubating individuals at infection-age τ, i.e.,
where γ (τ) is the rate (or force) of onset at infection-age
τ. Consequently, the density function of the incubation
period, f(τ), is given by
f(τ) = γ(τ)Γ(τ) (A3)
Since we assume that there is no secondary transmission
during quarantine period, i(t, τ) = 0 for t-τ > 0. The
number of new symptomatic cases at quarantine of length
t, n(t), is
Replacing the right-hand side of (A4) by that of (A1), we
get
In our setting, all quarantined individuals have not expe-
rienced symptom onset before quarantine starts at t = 0.
Assuming that all infected individuals eventually experi-
ence symptom onset (just for now), the total number of
infected individuals satisfies
Using (A5) and (A6), the density of symptom onset at
quarantine period t (i.e. the frequency of symptom onset
relative to the quarantine period t), h(t), is
Equation (A7) indicates the critical importance in under-
standing the earlier exposure in order to determine the
optimal length of quarantine. That is, the density of symp-
tom onset h(t) always depends on the infection-age distri-
bution (which is informed by j(τ)) at the starting time
point of quarantine (t = 0).
If the epidemic at the source country becomes endemic
and reaches a stationary state with constant incidence Q,
and if the infected travellers result from random sampling
of infected individuals at the source country, we have j(τ)
= QΓ(τ), leading to
which is equivalent to the survivorship of the incubating
infected individuals (written as 1-F(t) in the main text using
the cumulative distribution function of the incubation
period F(t)). The simplification in (A8) holds only when a
stationary state is the case at the source country, which is not
likely to be observed in the event of an influenza pandemic.
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j(τ). Nevertheless, since the infection event is unobservable,
we seldom know j(τ). Therefore, we recommend assuming
that the start of quarantine t = 0 as the time of infection,
which is the worst case scenario. Although the above men-
tioned arguments apply to symptomatic cases alone, we find
exactly the same issue in the survivorship of infectiousness.
Differing parameters between symptomatic and 
asymptomatic cases
First, we consider the impact of differing generation times
between symptomatic and asymptomatic cases on the
effectiveness of quarantine. Although the generation time
distribution of asymptomatic influenza infection has yet
to be clarified, we at least theoretically separate the cumu-
lative distributions Gs(t) and Ga(t), respectively, for symp-
tomatic and asymptomatic cases. The equation (4) in the
main text is replaced by
ε(t) = 1 - [α(1 - F(t))(1 - Gs(t)) + (1 - α) (1 - Ga(t))]
(A9)
Since Ga(t) is unknown, we examine the sensitivity of ε
(tβ), where the effectiveness is calculated as 100β % (i.e. β
= 0.95 and 0.99), to different ratios of Ga(tβ) to Gs(tβ). Let
c be Ga(tβ)/Gs(tβ). Gs(t) is assumed to be equivalent to G(t)
in the main text.
Figures 7A and 7B show the sensitivity of ε (tβ) to different
values of the ratio c with tβ = 4.74 and 8.62 days. When c
Sensitivity of the effectiveness of quarantine to uncertain epidemiologic variablesFigure 7
Sensitivity of the effectiveness of quarantine to uncertain epidemiologic variables. A & B. Effectiveness of quaran-
tine as a function of the ratio of the cumulative generation time among asymptomatic to symptomatic cases. Sensitivity of the 
point estimates of the effectiveness with baseline values of 95% and 99% are examined in A and B, respectively. C. Sensitivity of 
the effectiveness of quarantine in the presence of rapid diagnostic testing to the diagnostic sensitivity among asymptomatic 
infected individuals. D. Effectiveness of quarantine with imperfect efficacy of case detection of symptomatic cases.Page 12 of 14
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infected individuals with extremely long generation times
compared to symptomatic cases), the effectiveness meas-
ure (A9) becomes smaller than the baseline which we get
from (4) in the main text. On the contrary, if the genera-
tion time of asymptomatic infected individuals is shorter
than that of symptomatic infected individuals, the effec-
tiveness rises up close to 100% with the assumed lengths
of quarantine, suggesting the need to accumulate epide-
miological evidence of the generation time.
Second, we investigate the impact of differing sensitivity
of rapid diagnostic testing between symptomatic and
asymptomatic cases on the effectiveness of quarantine.
We theoretically separate the sensitivity Se into Se, s and Se,
a for symptomatic and asymptomatic cases, respectively.
Since asymptomatic cases may shed lower titres of virus,
we suspect that the ratio Se, a to Se, s (r := Se, a/Se, s) is smaller
than 1. The equation (5) in the main text is replaced by
εd(t) = 1- [(1 - Se, s) α(1 - F(t))(1 - G(t)) + (1 - Se, a) (1 - α)(1 
- G(t))] (A10)
Figure 7C shows the sensitivity of εd(t) to different values
of the ratio r assuming that Se, s = 0.69. As the ratio r
becomes smaller (i.e. as the diagnosis of asymptomatic
infected individuals becomes more difficult than that of
symptomatic cases), the effectiveness also becomes
smaller. Although the difference in εd(t) is greater for
short quarantine periods, the effectiveness becomes less
sensitive to r as the length of quarantine becomes longer.
We estimated that 99.0% effectiveness in reducing the risk
of introducing infectious individuals into the community
is achieved with t = 5.71 days using the rapid diagnostic
test of r = 1.0 in the main text. The effectiveness estimate
with the same length of quarantine and r = 0.6 is still as
large as 98.1%.
Imperfect case detection
Although we considered perfect detection of symptomatic
cases upon symptom onset during quarantine in the main
text, here we examine the sensitivity of the effectiveness of
quarantine to differing efficacy of case detection. Let the
efficacy of case finding be k which we assumed as 1 in the
main text. In reality, it might be difficult to detect all flu-
like symptoms (i.e. k < 1). The equation (4) in the main
text is replaced by
ε(t) = 1 - [α(1 - kF(t)) (1 - G(t)) + (1 - α) (1 - G(t))]
(A11)
It should be noted that k influences symptomatic cases
alone, because the detection of symptoms does not apply
to asymptomatic infected individuals. Figure 7D shows
the sensitivity of ε (t) to different values of the ratio k
which was assumed to lie in the range of 0.6 – 1.0. As the
ratio k becomes smaller (i.e. as the detection becomes less
efficient), the effectiveness becomes smaller. The differ-
ence in ε (t) between different ratios k is particularly high-
lighted when the quarantine period is between 2 and 5
days. Nevertheless, for the shorter and longer quarantine
periods, difference in ε (t) is almost negligible. In the
main text, we estimated that quarantine for 8.62 days
achieves 99.0% effectiveness of reducing the risk of releas-
ing infectious individuals into the community with k =
1.0. The effectiveness estimate with the same length of
quarantine and k = 0.6 is still as large as 98.2%.
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